Extensive evidence suggests that people use base rate information inconsistently in decision making. A classic example is the inverse base rate effect (IBRE), whereby participants classify ambiguous stimuli sharing features of both common and rare categories as members of the rare category. Computational models of the IBRE have either posited that it arises from associative similarity-based mechanisms or dissimilarity-based processes that may depend upon higher-level inference. Here we develop a hybrid model, which posits that similarity-and dissimilarity-based evidence both contribute to the IBRE, and test it using functional magnetic resonance imaging data collected from human subjects completing an IBRE task. Consistent with our model, multivoxel pattern analysis reveals that activation patterns on ambiguous test trials contain information consistent with dissimilarity-based processing. Further, trial-by-trial activation in left rostrolateral prefrontal cortex tracks model-based predictions for dissimilaritybased processing, consistent with theories positing a role for higher-level symbolic processing in the IBRE.
Introduction 1
Does this patient have influenza or Ebola virus? Categorization is a fundamental 2 process that underlies many important decisions. Categories, such as viruses, 3 often have different relative frequencies or base rates. Influenza, for example, is 4 very common and infects millions of people worldwide each year, whereas Ebola 5 virus tends to have infection rates that are orders of magnitude lower. 6
One critical question is how people use such base rate information when 7 making categorization decisions. Research so far has suggested that people 8 tend to be, at best, inconsistent in their use of base rate information. Both in 9 realistic studies with medical professionals and artificial categorization tasks in 10 the lab, when confronted with examples that share characteristics with both rare 11 and common categories, people show a tendency to predict the rare category 12 much more often than the base rates would suggest (Tversky & Kahneman, 13 to features for common and rare categories. Specifically, participants learn to 24 attend more strongly to features of rare categories, making ambiguous cases 25 seem more similar to rare categories and thus more likely to be rare category 26 members. In terms of the flu example, participants may attend more to the 27 unexplained bleeding feature of the rarer Ebola virus category, and thus predict 28
Ebola when confronted with a patient with both features. 29
Similarity-based category learning models have strong support in the 30 neurobiological category learning literature. Model-based predictions for how 31 similar items are to stored category representations have been shown to 32 correlate with activation in the medial temporal lobes (MTL; Davis, Love & 33 Preston, 2012a; 2012b). Moreover, at a finer-grained level, multivoxel activation 34 patterns in the MTL have been shown to contain information associated with 35 higher-order similarity relationships between category members anticipated by 36 similarity-based models (Davis & Poldrack, 2014) , including those predicted by 37 differences in selective attention (Mack, Love & Preston, 2016) . The dorsolateral 38 prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) tends to track predictions of choice uncertainty from 39 from the reliance on dissimilarity processes, either on their own, or in addition to 47 similarity-based processes. According to theories that focus on dissimilarity-48 based processes, people build strong expectations of the common category; thus 49 they view items containing features inconsistent with these expectations as more 50 likely to be members of the rare category (Juslin, Wennerholm & Winman, 2001 ; 51 Winman et al., 2005) . For example, a doctor may have seen thousands of cases 52 of flu, none with unexplained bleeding, and thus rule out influenza and choose 53
Ebola virus based on these expectations. In these cases, it is dissimilarity to 54 members of the common category that drives choice, rather than the similarity to 55 rare category members per se. 56
Formal models positing dissimilarity processes have so far been explicitly 57 dual-process oriented. For example, ELMO, a computational model that 58 incorporates a choice elimination decision based on dissimilarity argues that 59 such elimination depends on explicit reasoning processes that are separate from 60 similarity-based processes that arise on other trials (Juslin, Wennerholm & 61 Winman, 2001 ). In the present study, we propose a new account based on a 62 recently proposed dissimilarity-based extension of the generalized context 63 model, the dissGCM (Stewart & Morin, 2007) . This account uses the exact same 64 basic similarity computations as standard similarity-based models (e.g., 65
Nosofsky, 1986), but allows similarities and dissimilarities to stored exemplars to 66 be used as evidence for a category. In terms of the above example, dissimilarity 67 to influenza can be used as evidence for Ebola (and vice versa).
As specified computationally, the dissGCM is agnostic about whether 69 dissimilarity-based evidence constitutes a different cognitive or neurobiological 70 mechanism from similarity-based evidence. On one hand, the dissGCM has no 71 fundamentally different computations from a basic similarity process; as detailed 72 below, dissimilarity is a simple transformation of similarity. On the other hand, it is 73 possible that dissimilarity processes require manipulating similarity relationships 74 between category representations in a more symbolic or abstract manner, as 75 anticipated by previous dissimilarity theories. 76
Higher-level cognitive control mechanisms are thought to depend upon a 77 hierarchy of abstraction in the lateral PFC along the rostral-caudal axis (Badre & 78 D'Esposito, 2007 , 2009 Davis, Goldwater, & Giron, 2017) . In addition to its role in 84 generalizing abstract, relational rules, we have recently found left rlPFC to be 85 involved in rule evaluation and novel generalization processes for simpler 86 feature-based rules in categorization tasks (Paniukov & Davis, 2018) . In the 87 present study, dissimilarity-based generalization to novel feature pairings may 88 depend on rule evaluation processes in the rlPFC more so than simple similarity-89 based processing, if studies anticipating that dissimilarity-based processes depend more upon higher-level symbolic rules are correct (Juslin, Wennerholm, 91 & Winman, 2001; Winman et al., 2005) . 92
Here we test the dissGCM by incorporating its predictions into an analysis 93 of fMRI data collected from participants completing a standard IBRE task (Medin 94 & Edelson, 1988; Kruschke, 1996) . We first examine whether activation patterns 95 elicited during conflicting trials in the IBRE task are consistent with participants 96 thinking more about the rare category, as predicted by pure similarity-based 97 accounts, or thinking more about (dissimilarity to) the common category, as 98 predicted by the dissGCM. To this end, we use representational similarity 99 analysis (RSA; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008) between activation patterns elicited for the key IBRE trials and feature-specific 111 patterns from an independent localizer scan. By crossing the visual stimulus 112 features with our category structure (Figure 1 ), we create situations where a rare category is associated with one feature type (e.g., a scene) whereas a common 114 category is associated with another feature type (e.g., an object). The extent to 115 which each type of information is active can then be compared to determine 116 whether participants are thinking more about common or rare categories on a corresponds to a learning trial, with a "1" indicating the presence of the feature and "0" indicating In addition to our multivoxel analysis, we also test whether the 128 dissimilarity-based evidence may tap distinct brain regions, such as the rlPFC, 129 beyond those involved with similarity-based evidence. To this end, we take trial-130 by-trial predictions for how much similarity-and dissimilarity-based evidence 131 contribute to the winning category choice and use these predictions as 132 regressors in fMRI analysis. We anticipated that the MTL and vmPFC would be 133 positively associated with similarity-based evidence, whereas dlPFC would be 134 negatively associated with similarity-based evidence. Contrastingly, we expected 135 rlPFC to track estimates of dissimilarity-based evidence. The dissimilarity generalized context model (dissGCM) is based off of the original 139 generalized context model (Nosofsky, 1986 ), but allows for dissimilarity to be 140 used as evidence for a decision (Stewart & Morin, 2007) . The model posits that 141 people represent stimuli as points in a multidimensional feature space. 142
Categorization judgments are based off of distances between probe stimuli Si 143 and stored exemplars Sj along each dimension k: 144
the distance along strongly attended dimensions, and are constrained to sum to 148
one. 149
Distances are converted to similarities via an exponential transform: 150
where c is a specificity parameter that controls the rate at which similarity decays 153 as a function of distance. 154
Like the standard GCM, similarities to all exemplars of each category are 155 summed into evidence for each category. However, in the dissGCM, evidence 156 that an item is dissimilar to other categories is also used as evidence for a 157 category. For example, evidence for Disease 1 includes not only an item's 158 similarity to members of Disease 1, but also its dissimilarity to other diseases. 159
The overall evidence, v, for a category C A , given stimulus S i is: 160
where s is a free parameter that determines how much the model weights 162 similarity versus dissimilarity. The parameter t j reflects exemplar-specific memory 163 strength, which we fix at each exemplar's true base rate during learning (1 for 164 rare category exemplars, 3 for common category exemplars). Here, we also 165 make the assumption that exemplars only contribute evidence (similarity or 166 dissimilarity) if they have at least one positive feature match with a probe
The model makes a prediction for how likely an item is to be classified as 169 a member of a given category C A by: 170
where b is a free parameter that reflects the baseline level of similarity for a 172 category that has zero positive feature matches. More generally, this parameter 173 ensures that no predicted probabilities are zero or one, which interferes with the 174 maximum likelihood-based model fits. 175
The model was fit to the group response frequencies for each option by 176 minimizing the -2 * Log Likelihood (G 2 ) using a differential evolution function 177 optimizer. The overall fit was 4,314.588. The best fitting parameters for each of 178 the dimension weights were w 1 (face 1) = 0.277, w 2 (common scene) = 0.665, w 3 179 (rare object) = 0.887, w 4 (face 2) = 0.170, w 5 (common object) = 0.712, and w 6 180 (rare scene) = 0.879); c = 9.05; s = 0.946; b = 0.023. 181
For the model-based neuroimaging analysis, we break the evidence v for 182 the winning (most probable) category into separate measures indicating the 183 similarity-based evidence (the summed similarity to the winning category) and 184 dissimilarity-based evidence (summed dissimilarity to other categories). Likewise, 185
for the multivoxel analysis we examine how much each category's exemplars 186 (common and rare) contribute to the rare response for ambiguous items to 187 predict how strongly participants should be activating information associated with 188 each category. 189
Results 191

Behavioral Results 192
Learning curves over the 12 learning blocks for common and rare disease item 193 pairs are shown in Figure 2 . All subjects reached greater than 90% accuracy 194 over the last 4 blocks (M = 98.1%, SD = 2.4%, range = 93.5 -100%). Mean 195 choice performance in the first block was above chance (25%) for both common 196 (M = 63.6%) and rare (M = 43.2%) feature pairs. Consistent with previous IBRE 197 studies, a mixed effects ANOVA revealed a significant block by feature type 198 interaction, F (1, 21) = 9.87, p = .005: the common diseases were learned more 199 quickly than the rare diseases, with prediction accuracy for the common and rare items are summarized in Table 1 . Consistent with an inverse base-rate effect, 204 participants were numerically more likely to classify ambiguous test stimuli 205 (combinations of rare and common features) as members of the relevant rare 206 category (M = 47.6%) than the relevant common category (M = 43.4%). A one-207 sample t-test revealed that the percentage of rare responding on ambiguous 208 trials was significantly higher than the 1/4 base rate for the rare category, t (21) = 209
. 
Multivoxel Results 218
Test Phase. The primary goal of the multivoxel analysis was to decode, for the 219 ambiguous stimuli, whether participants were thinking more about the common or 220 rare category when they make the choice to classify the stimulus as rare. 221
Specifically, for the bold italicized stimuli listed in Table 1 , we tested whether 222 participants' activation patterns were more similar to localizer activation patterns 223 associated with scenes when a scene was the common feature (and object was 224 rare) and more similar to those of objects when an object was the common 225 feature (and scene was rare). 226
The prediction that information associated with the common category 227 should be more active on ambiguous trials is derived from the dissGCM. The 228 model posits that the higher probability for a rare response is based on the 229 contribution that dissimilarity to the common category makes to the evidence for 230 the rare category. Indeed, in the fitted version of the model, the evidence for rare 231 contributed by similarity to the rare category exemplar was nearly half the 232 evidence contributed by dissimilarity to the common category exemplar (rare = 233 0.088; common = 0.153, in the dissGCM's attention weighted similarity units). 234
Neural similarities to both visual stimulus categories on the ambiguous 235 test trials are depicted in Figure 3 . Consistent with the dissGCM's predictions, a 236 linear mixed effects model revealed that when participants made a rare choice, their activation patterns were most similar to whichever visual stimulus category 238 (scenes or objects) was associated with the common category, t (21) = 2.78, p = 239 .011. Interestingly, there was no significant difference between pattern similarity 240 for rare and common features when participants made a common response, t 241 (21) = 0.45, p =.653. This pattern, whereby participants tended to only 242 differentially activate patterns associated with common features when they made 243 a rare response, manifested in a significant interaction, t (42) = -2.22, p = .032. By revealing a link between activation of common feature patterns and the IBRE, 300 our multivoxel results suggest that dissimilarity-based evidence contributes to 301 choice behavior in the present task. However, it remains an open question 302 whether such dissimilarity processes involve distinct neural or cognitive 303 mechanisms beyond those thought to underlie basic similarity processes. 304
To test whether similarity-and dissimilarity-based evidence rely on 305 different brain regions, we modeled univariate voxel-wise activation using trial-306 by-trial estimates of similarity-and dissimilarity-based evidence derived from the 307 dissGCM ( Figure 6 ). We found activation in the MTL and vmPFC that was 308 positively correlated with similarity-based evidence, whereas the dlPFC and 309 posterior parietal cortex were negatively correlated with similarity-based 310 evidence. These results are consistent with findings from other model-based 311 fMRI studies suggesting that the MTL is involved in similarity-based retrieval 312 
Discussion 336
The present study employed model-based fMRI to test how similarity and 337 dissimilarity contribute to the inverse base rate effect (IBRE) and how these 338 types of evidence relate to neural mechanisms that support category learning. 339
The dominant theory behind the IBRE suggests that it arises from attentional 340 processes that make ambiguous items containing features of rare and common 341 categories seem more similar to members of the rare category. Here we find 342 support for the hypothesis that dissimilarity-based evidence also contributes to 343 the IBRE: people may categorize the ambiguous stimuli as members of the rare 344 category not only because of their similarity to the rare category, but also 345 because of their dissimilarity to members of the common category. 346
The dissGCM, an extension of the GCM that allows for the use of ambiguous stimulus is similar to a given category must be combined with the 388 evidence that the stimulus is dissimilar to the other possible categories. Although 389 the dissGCM instantiates dissimilarity as a simple transformation of similarity, the 390 involvement of rlPFC when participants place more reliance on dissimilarity-391 based evidence may be attributable to increasing demands for integrating 392 evidence across several abstract representations. A decision based on pure 393 similarity-based evidence would require no such integration. This hypothesis 394 accords with recent findings implicating the rlPFC in evaluative processes for 395 categorization tasks that require candidate rules to be weighed over the course 396 of several trials, relative to matching tasks where a rule can be known with 397 certainty following a single correct trial (Paniukov & Davis, 2018) . 398
One question that has arisen repeatedly in the literature on the IBRE is 399 whether it reflects an inherent irrationality in decision making. When viewed 400 through the lens of basic similarity-based attentional processes (e.g., Medin & 401 Edelson, 1988; Kruschke, 1996 Kruschke, , 2001 , the IBRE appears to arise from very 402 simple learning mechanisms that are not particularly tied to higher-level rationality, and rare choices seem to indicate a lack of knowledge of the base 404 rates. Indeed, in a separate model fit, we attempted to fit the standard similarity-405 based GCM to the key pattern on the ambiguous trials. However, the standard 406 GCM was only able to predict a greater proportion of rare choices if accurate 407 knowledge of the exemplar base-rates was eliminated (all values of t j = 1 or fit as 408 free parameters). In contrast, accurate knowledge of the category base rates 409 directly contributes to the greater dissimilarity-based evidence against the 410 common category. Thus from the dissGCM perspective, participants are perfectly 411 knowledgeable about the base rates in the present task, but they use this 412 knowledge in a way not anticipated by pure similarity-based models. However, 413 whether this use of dissimilarity-based evidence constitutes irrationality is a 414 deeper question that cannot be answered based purely on the present results. 415
The IBRE exemplifies a case in cognitive neuroscience where 416 independent models that predict essentially the same behavioral patterns make 417 very different assumptions about the cognitive processes, and accordingly, brain 418 states, involved in producing the behavior. Our findings from the test phase 419 represent a critical step forward in an emerging area of research using 420 multivariate fMRI to reveal that qualitatively distinct brain states may reflect the 421 the same approach to decode which information participants were focusing on 427 during ambiguous test trials, we found stronger activation of patterns associated 428 with common compared to rare stimulus features, but importantly, this pattern 429 only emerged in cases where participants chose the rare category. Although 430 these results are consistent with a dissimilarity-based process where activating 431 knowledge of the common feature provides contrastive evidence against the 432 well-established common category, understanding the precise cognitive 433 mechanisms that contribute to these response-dependent activation patterns 434 remains a direction for future research. One possibility is that common choices 435 stem from habitual response patterns that involve feature matching and require 436 little active deliberation, and hence less activation of featural information in the 437 associated multivoxel activation patterns, whereas more actively weighing the 438 evidence for each category engages a "strategic guessing" process that involves 439 ruling out the most unlikely option (Juslin, Wennerholm, & Winman, 2001) . 440
Interestingly, while our findings argue against the prediction from 441 similarity-based models that the IBRE arises because rare features become 442 more similar to their associated category, the observed parameters from the 443 model fits are consistent with a key part of similarity theory -that there is greater 444 selective attention allocated to the rare feature dimension. Indeed, the rare 445 feature dimensions outweighed the common features for both sets of categories 446 in our data. However, these larger attention weights did not seem to drive greater 447 neural similarity to the rare feature dimension in our multivoxel results. simple feature-based attention, but instead indicate some combination of 450 attention and memory-based retrieval of the category exemplars. This hypothesis 451 coincides with findings from the memory literature, which have found that 452 memory-based retrieval of non-present, associated stimuli can be detectable in 453 activation patterns (e.g., Zeithamova, Dominick & Preston, 2012 ; for review, see 454
Rissman & Wagner, 2012). Future studies may wish to combine multivoxel 455 pattern analysis with eye-tracking (e.g., Leong et al., 2017) to better understand 456 the unique contributions that attention and memory make to the present results. 457
In conclusion, using model-based fMRI analysis, we found evidence that 458 extreme cases of base rate neglect such as the IBRE may arise from a 459 combination of similarity-and dissimilarity-based processes. Accordingly, 460 measures of neural activation suggest that people may be more strongly relying 461 on evidence about how dissimilar an item is to common categories when faced 462 with ambiguous stimuli. Further, dissimilarity processes have a unique cortical 463 topography that includes the rostrolateral PFC, a region believed to be involved 464 with more symbolic feature processing. 465 466
Materials and Methods 467
Twenty-four healthy right-handed volunteers (age range 18 -58; 13 women) 468 participated in the study for $35. All protocols were approved by the Texas Tech 469
University IRB. Two participants were excluded, one for falling asleep and the 470 other for excessive head motion. 471
Behavioral Protocol 473
The study consisted of three phases, localizer, learning, and test. The localizer 474 phase consisted of two scanning runs in which participants classified images 475 based on whether they contained a face, an object, or a scene. Each image was 476 presented for 2.5 s during which participants were asked to respond "Scene (1), 477 were presented in a random order, and did not include any of the images used 483 for the experimental task. 484
In the learning phase, participants learned a classic IBRE category 485 structure based on Medin and Edelson (1988; See Figure 1 ). The features used 486 for the stimuli included examples of faces, objects, and scenes not shown in the 487 localizer phase. Participants were given an epidemiological cover story asking 488 them to predict whether hypothetical patients would contract a disease based on 489 the people they have been in contact with (faces), the objects they have used 490 (objects), and the places they have been (scenes). On each trial of the learning 491 phase, participants would see a stimulus for 3 s and were asked to answer 492 "Disease 1, 2, 3, or 4?" This was followed by random fixation, feedback (1.75 s) 493 in which they were told whether they were right or wrong and the correct answer, 494 and additional fixation. The same distribution was used to generate fixations as in the localizer phase. Faces were always assigned to the imperfectly predictive 496 feature dimensions, whereas objects and scenes were perfectly predictive and 497 associated with only one disease (Figure 1 ). To ensure that no visual stimulus 498 category differed in overall frequency, one common disease always was 499 associated with objects and the other scenes, and likewise for rare diseases. 500
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions to balance which 501 images were presented together during learning and test, and disease labels 502 During the test phase, participants completed trials with both new and old 510 exemplars and classified them as "Disease 1, 2, 3, or 4?", but no longer received 511 feedback. New items included all possible single and two-feature combinations of 512 the perfectly predictive features (see Table 1 , Results). Trials were 3 s and 513 separated by random fixation as described above. Like the learning phase, the 514 test phase occurred over three consecutive scanning runs. Presentation order of 515 the test items was randomized for each of the three runs, with participants rating 516 two test sets per run, resulting in a total of 156 test trials.
Image Acquisition 519
Imaging data were acquired on a 3.0 T Siemens Skyra MRI scanner at the Texas 520 Tech Neuroimaging Institute. Structural images were acquired in the sagittal 521 plane using MPRAGE whole-brain anatomical scans (TR = 1.9 s; TE = 2.44 ms; Functional data were preprocessed and analyzed using FSL 529 (www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). Anatomical images were preprocessed using 530 Freesurfer (autorecon1). Functional images were skull stripped, motion 531 corrected, prewhitened, and high-pass filtered (cutoff: 60 s). For the model-532 based univariate analysis, functional images were spatially smoothed using a 6 533 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. No smoothing was performed on functional data 534 used for the multivoxel analysis. First-level statistical maps were registered to 535 the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)-152 template using 6-DOF boundary-536 based registration to align the functional image to the Freesurfer-processed 537 high-resolution anatomical image, and 12-DOF affine registration to the MNI-152 538
brain. 539
The model-based univariate analysis employed a standard three-level included an EV for stimulus presentation and two model-based parametric 542 modulators: Similarity-and Dissimilarity-based evidence, computed from the 543 dissGCM. Both parametric modulators were centered and scaled (z-scored) 544
within run. Calculation of these regressors is described in the Model section. 545
Additional explanatory variables (EVs) of no interest included motion parameters, 546 their temporal derivatives, EVs to censor volumes exceeding a framewise 547 displacement of 0.9mm (Siegel et al., 2014) , and an EV to account for trials in 548 which participants failed to make a behavioral response. Final statistical maps 549 were corrected for multiple comparisons using a non-parametric cluster-mass-550 based correction with a cluster-forming threshold of t (21) = 3.52 (p < .001, one-551 tailed). 552
RSA was conducted using the PyMVPA toolbox (Hanke et al., 2009 ) and 553 custom Python routines. In this analysis, we measured how much participants 554 were activating scene, object, and face information on individual test phase trials 555 by calculating mean correlation distance (1 -Pearson's r) between activation 556 patterns on each test trial and those elicited for each visual category during the 557 localizer phase. For interpretative ease, the distances were converted to 558 similarities using exp(-distance), and then standardized (z-scored) within 559 participants. Activation patterns were estimated for each trial using a Least 560 Squares All procedure (Mumford et al., 2012) , and anatomically restricted to two 561 ventral temporal ROIs that were maximally responsive to scene and object 562 information in the localizer data. Specifically, pattern estimates were spatially around subjects' peak activation within anatomically defined regions in the 565 
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